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Article 2

DEVELOPMENTS IN LAND USE CONTROL

John D. Johnston, Jr.*
I. Police Power
A.

Zoning

Recent zoning decisions reflect tension between competing social forces,
perceivable on several different levels.
Of prime significance is the continuing exodus of families from city cores
to suburbs and the correlative efforts of suburban municipalities to utilize zoning
techniques (1) to restrict the rate of admission of new residents and, even more
significantly, (2) to limit access to the suburban haven to families deemed
socioeconomically acceptable. Concurrently, 'zoning concepts are rapidly evolving from static specification patterns (called "euclidean zoning" after the wellknown Supreme Court decision)' to flexible, performance-oriented techniques
such as the floating zone, cluster zone, and planned unit development. While
planners have generally embraced these new devices, local legislatures and state
courts have been more reticent to sanction their use. In addition, the recent
extension of zoning power to include effectuation of purely aesthetic objectives
presents renewed opportunities for conflict between such groups as advertisers,
junkyard operators, and homebuilders on the one hand, and local legislatures,
planning commissions, or design control boards on the other. Finally, there is
the omnipresent struggle between the landowner-developer attempting to maximize his economic return and the local legislature or board of zoning appeals
striving to harmonize such individual interests with the broader social interests
of the entire community. While the foregoing exposition of land-use conflicts is
by no means exhaustive, it has nevertheless supplied the courts with a number
of recent noteworthy zoning cases.
1. Aesthetics
Subsequent to an often-quoted dictum by Mr. Justice Douglas,2 the New
York Court of Appeals frankly recognized in People v. Stove' that purely
aesthetic considerations may be adequate to support police power regulation in
furtherance of the "public welfare." As might be expected, subsequent cases are
testing the limits of the new doctrine. Two types of regulation associated with
zoning ordinances have generated particular interest: nonaccessory advertising
and architectural design control.
* Professor of Law, New York University. A.B., Duke University (1954); LL.B., Duke
University (1956). Copyright 1970 by New York University, all rights reserved. This article

will also appear in 1969/70 ANN. SURVEY AM. L.
1 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

2 "It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).

3

12 N.Y.2d. 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[Spring, 1970]

Following the lead of New Jersey, New York, and Oregon, which upheld
local ordinances excluding from entire communities such activities as nonaccessory advertising4 and automobile wrecking yards,' several jurisdictions have
upheld regulation of such unsightly commercial operations0 on aesthetic grounds.
These courts have rejected the argument that since such "evils" are incident to
admittedly legitimate nonnuisance commercial activity, their exclusion from
commercial or industrial zones is arbitrary and unreasonable. 7
To be completely effective, of course, such regulation should not only
forbid new construction of such "aesthetic nuisances," but must also provide
for the termination of preexisting nonconforming activities. Such action, however, may result in a substantial loss to the owner of an investment that was
perfectly legitimate when initiated. A technique for mitigating the harshness of
this result is the so-called "amortization statute," which specifies a grace period
beyond the effective date of the ordinance during which nonconforming uses
may be maintained with impunity. The nonconforming uses must, however,
be terminated at the end of the period. The grace period is usually specified in
gross rather than- as a function of investment recapture; it is typically greater for
a nonconforming structure than for a nonconforming use in a conforming structure.' A few courts have upheld the taking of advertising easements without
compensation where there was no actual billboard antedating the taking.9
Where there are signs already in existence, an amortization provision may be
constitutionally required' if there is no provision for compensation to the
owner." A three-year amortization ordinance was upheld in a recent Minnesota
4 United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22, 225 N.E.2d 749 (1967), overruling Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8 N.E.2d 286 (1937).
5 Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
6 E.g., State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967) (nonaccessory
advertising); Racine County v. Plourde, 38 Wis. 2d 403, 157 N.W.2d 591 (1968) (automobile
wrecking yard). See Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782 (Fla. App. 1967), which
upheld a requirement for screening of junkyards.
7 The opinion in United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964)
is rather carefully qualified on this point: "[Metuchen's] essential character is residential. Its
business and industrial areas are relatively limited and the municipal aim is to achieve the
maximum degree of compatibility with the residential areas." Id. at 8, 198 A.2d at 450.,
In an interesting dissent, Justice Hall agreed that aesthetics ought be recognized as the
actual motivation behind advertising regulation. He felt compelled, however, to reject as
"unfair, unequal, and unreasonable" the exemption of accessory, or "on-premises" signs. "It is
common knowledge that on-premises signs are frequently just as ugly and offensive as conventional billboards, if not even more garish." Id. at 12-13, 198 A.2d at 453.
8 The best opinion upholding an amortization ordinance is City of Los Angeles v. Gage,
127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954). The leading case, Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4
N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 169 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958), is much more equivocal. It was a 4-3
decision with only two judges joining in the opinion of the court. Contra, Hoffmann v. Kinealy,
389 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1965); City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697
(1953).
9 E.g., Wolfe v. State Dep't of Rds., 179 Neb. 189, 137 N.W.2d 721 (1965); Fulmer v.
State Dep't of Rds., 178 Neb. 664, 134 N.W.2d 798 (1965).
10 But, cf. Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
11 Although a number of state advertising control statutes make no express provision for
payment of compensation to owners of existing signs, a 1965 Congressional enactment contains
both an amortization provision and a compensation requirement for sign removal in connection
with the interstate highway system. 23 U.S.C. § 131 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See 42 Op.
Arr'y GEN. 26 (1966). A similar procedure is in effect with respect to screening or removal
of junkyards and "automobile graveyards" along the interstate highway system. 23 U.S.C. § 136
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). The federal share of compensation payable under each program is
seventy-five percent.
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case12 despite testimony that the cost of removal and relocation of the plaintiffs'
billboards would exceed $44,000. Shorter periods for termination of junkyards
have been upheld in other cases."
The most comprehensive regulatory scheme for nonaccessory advertising
was established by a recent Vermont statute.'4 It creates a statewide Travel Information Council with exclusive authority to establish official tourist information centers and "sign plazas" along the state's highways; to regulate the manner
of display of business directional signs; to issue licenses for the construction of
such signs (no more than four licenses per eligible business); and to require the
removal of nonconforming signs. 5 An amortization clause permits continuance
of nonconforming signs for a maximum of five years;' 6 accessory signs are not
prohibited." The pervasiveness of the statute is indicated by the provision that
"[n]o person may erect or maintain outdoor advertising visible, to the travelling
public except as provided in this chapter."'" Violators are subject to a maximum
fine of $100 and thirty days imprisonment, and each day a sign is illegally
maintained constitutes a separate offense.' 9 While the constitutionality of this
legislation has not yet been finally determined, it is likely to survive broad-gauge
attack, although it could be declared inapplicable in situations of great hardship
under the doctrine of Nectow v. City of Cambridge,2"
A recent decision 2' to the contrary, holding a. Georgia outdoor advertising
control statute void on its face, contains little more than repeated assertions'of
the conclusion reached and is therefore unpersuasive. A Washington decision 2
upholding similar legislation after careful consideration of the issues is entitled to
greater respect.
A second extension of the power to regulate land use to achieve purely
aesthetic objectives-design control-has met with much less success. Design
control is an attempt to protect a municipality against "excessive similarity or
dissimilarity" between the design and exterior appearance of existing structures
and those whose construction is proposed. The control mechanism inheres in a
requirement that each applicant for a building permit submit to a "design control
board" or "architectural advisory committee" sufficient data for it to judge the
compatibility of the proposed structure with existing buildings. A construction
permit may not be issued unless the architectural control authority makes a
favorable finding.
12 Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 442, 162 N.W.2d 206
(1968).
13 Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 230 A.2d 310 (1967) (two years); LaChapelle v. Town of Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967) (one year).
14 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 321-45 (Supp. 1968). The legislation was enacted in 1967,
and became effective March 23, 1968.
15 Id., § 337. Compensation is provided oily on those cases where federal funds are available. Id. § 336. See note 11 supra.
16 Id. § 338.

17 Id. § 333.
18 Id. § 328.
19 Id. § 343.
20 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
21 State Highway Dep't v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770, 152 S.E.2d 372 (1966).
22 Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
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In an early Florida decision" a West Palm Beach ordinance that required
building inspectors to find proposed structures "substantially equal" in appearance to existing residences was invalidated on the ground that it delegated legislative (zoning) power to the inspector without providing sufficiently definite
standards governing the exercise of that power. A more recent Wisconsin
decision24 upheld a requirement that no building permit be issued unless a review
board (composed of three residents, at least two of whom were required to be
architects) found that the "exterior architectural appeal and functional plan" of
the proposed structure would not be so at variance with existing structures "as to
cause a substantial depreciation in property values." These are the only decisions
on point by state courts of last resort that have come to the reviewer's attention.
Recent decisions by at least four state trial and intermediate appellate courts,
however, are extant; three invalidated similar ordinances. Two 5 followed the
reasoning of the Florida court; the third2 6 held that the review board procedure
was not authorized by the state zoning enabling act. The only case upholding
the design review procedureF7 relied primarily on the settled character of the
existing neighborhood and on testimony that the proposed residence would have
an adverse effect upon the value of surrounding properties. The validity of
design control ordinances 8 is by no means a settled issue, and further litigation
can be anticipated. Professor Michelman has recently attempted to clarify the
policy considerations relevant to the validity of such legislation. 9
2.

Zoning Flexibility

A major advance in zoning administration was signalled by the New York
case of Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown," which upheld the "floating zone"
concept." At least four different arguments have been advanced against this
23 City of West Palm Beach v. State, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
24 State v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217 (1955).
25 Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 Ill. App. 2d 218, 244 N.E.2d
369 (1968); State ex rel. Magidson v. Henze, 342 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. App. 1961).
26 Piscitelli v. Township Comm., 103 N.J. Super. 589, 248 A.2d 274 (Super. Ct. 1968).
27 Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d 74 (1963).
28 Design controls are also a feature of "landmark" or historical area zoning. They restrict
the owner's ability to alter the exterior appearance of his structure. This type of regulation has
been upheld as to areas of settled character and demonstrated tourist appeal. See, e.g., City of
New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); Opinion of the Justices, 333
Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955) (Nantucket); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964). The Vieux Carre regulations in New Orleans were held
inapplicable in City of New Orleans v. Levy, 233 La. 844, 98 So. 2d 210 (1957) on special
findings that enforcement would be discriminatory in view of the existence of numerous unpunished violations.
As applied to individual structures whose architectural or historical interest generates no
economic return, the validity of preservation laws is less certain. See, e.g., Trustees of Sailors'
Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1st Dept. 1968).
29 Micheliman, Toward a Practical Standard for Aesthetic Regulation, 15 PRAc. LAw 36
(Feb. 1969).
30 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
31 The local legislature created a new district in which multiple family dwellings were
permitted. The boundaries of the new district were not fixed, however. Any owner within an
existing low-density residential district could petition for rezoning of his land to the new classification. If his petition met the prescribed requirements, the local legislature would enact a
rezoning ordinance. The new, higher density zone would then appear on the zoning map as an
enclave within the preexisting lower density zone. The possibility of rezoning other land would
continue to exist; hence, the ultimate boundaries of the new zone would remain unfixed.
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device: that it is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan, 2 that it constitutes an unauthorized delegation of zoning power by the local legislature s
without provision of adequate standards,3 4 and that it is inconsistent with the
original concept of zoning-lines drawn on a map to indicate zones---by failing
to provide public notice of the permitted uses within each zone." The floating
zone, on the other hand, does not appear on the zoning map until an eligible'
landowner requests rezoning to the special "floating" classification; only after
approval is granted does a new zone line appear on the map. Another line of
attack has been that such rezoning inures to the benefit of an individual landowner and thus constitutes illegal "spot zoning." The spot zoning issue often
affords state courts an opportunity to inquire into the motives of the local
legislature and to invalidate rezoning legislation motivated primarily by a desire
to benefit a single owner. The legal principle is, however, stated somewhat
differently: zoning ordinance amendments that benefit individual landowners are
not invalid per se; they are invalid only if they are not "in accordance with a
comprehensive plan.""7 Thus, the spot zoning contention merges into the original
line of argument over compatibility of the floating zone with the comprehensive
plan concept.
Although the floating zone survived in New York, it encountered difficulties
in Maryland38 and Pennsylvania. 9 It can perhaps be safely predicted that the
level of judicial hostility to this device will remain a function of (1) the degree
of judicial unfamiliarity with the evolutionary development of zoning concepts,
32 Most state zoning enabling statutes repeat the requirement of the prototype statute that
ordinances must be "made in accordance with a comprehensive plan," to prevent "haphazard
or piecemeal zoning." U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT
§ 3 '(rev. ed. 1926). It would thus appear that adoption of a master plan should precede
enactment of zoning ordinances. However, such was not the case in many municipalities. Consequently, the judiciary has experienced great difficulty in applying this requirement to individual enactments. See Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan," 68 H~Av. L. REv.
1154, (1955).
33 When a court doubts the constitutionality (wisdom?) of a new land use device, it can
avoid direct confrontation of the issue by declaring that its use is not authorized by the applicable state enabling act. See, e.g., Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions:
The Quest for a Rationale,52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 887 (1967).
34 This rationale is frequently employed to invalidate regulations that offend the notions
of state court judges regarding "economic due process." The contrast between their attitudes
and those of the Supreme Court is striking. Compare McCloskey, Economic Due Process and
the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuPREAME COURT REVIEw 34 (Kurland
ed.) with Paulsen, The Persistenceof Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. Rav.

91 (1950).
35 "The essence of zoning is territorial division according to the character of the lands and
structures and their peculiar suitability for particular uses, and uniformity of use within the
division." Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 9 N.J. 405, 417, 88 A.2d 607, 612 (1952).
36 In Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N. Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951), rezoning
was permissible only if the petitioner's plans showed a minimum of ten acres of land, a maximum building height of three stories, adherence to strict building setback and spacing requirements, and no more than fifteen percent coverage of the ground area by buildings.
37 The vagueness of this standard was discussed in note 32, supra. In the spot zoning
cases, it functions as a rubric under which zoning amendments tainted by impermissible legislative motives, such as individual favoritism, can be invalidated without accusing local legislators of moral turpitude.
38 In Huff v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 214 Md. 48, 133 A.2d 83 (1957), a "restricted
manufacturing" use was authorized, by special exception, in a residential zone. The Maryland
Court of Appeals held that a decision by the local board granting such an exception was not
invalid spot zoning. The opinion cited Rodgers v. Tarrytown with approval.
In MacDonald v. Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 210 A.2d 325 (1965), the
court invalidated an ordinance rezoning land in a low-density residential district for high rise
residential use. The majority relied on the presumption of correctness in the original zoning,
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and (2) the degree of "incompatibility" perceived to exist between the uses
permitted
within the larger, fixed zone and the uses permitted within the floating
4 °
zone.
Another zoning innovation aimed at greater flexibility is the planned unit
development.41 Like the floating zone, this device provides an incentive for
owners to utilize advanced design concepts in planning large-scale developments
within districts characterized by adherence to traditional use and density patterns.
Unlike floating zones, which may be used to inject commercial or even industrial
uses into a residential area, the planned unit development is a residential use

holding that there was insufficient evidence of original mistake or subsequent change of conditions to uphold the ordinance. In a brilliant dissenting opinion, Judge Barnes attacked the
premises underlying the mistake-change requirement and concluded that it tended to produce
an unfortunate rigidity in zoning administration.
In Beall v. Montgomery County Council, 240 Md. 77, 212 A.2d 751 (1965), Judge Barnes,
speaking for a unanimous court, refused to apply the mistake-change requirement to an amendment rezoning land from low density residential to a high rise, planned residential classification.
Noting that the situation was similar to the floating zone in some respects, he relied upon
Rodgers and Huff in sustaining the ordinance. MacDonald was distinguished on the ground
that there the local planning commission had disapproved the proposed amendment, whereas
in Beall the commission had approved it.
The court reverted to the mistake-change requirement in Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 241 Md. 187, 216 A.2d 149 (1966), and invalidated an amendment
rezoning land from single-family homes to a garden apartment classification. Judge Barnes
again dissented, arguing that the "fairly debatable" rule should supplant it.
In another about-face, the court sustained amendments rezoning land from low-density
residential use to higher-density planned residential developments in Bujno v. Montgomery
County Council, 243 Md. 110, 220 A.2d 126 (1966) and Knudsen v. Montgomery County
Council, 241 Md. 436, 217 A.2d 97 (1966). Both opinions by Judge Barnes for a unanmous
court classified the procedure as a floating zone and relied on Beall and Huff. The mistakechange rule was therefore held inapplicable.
The Maryland court thus has two clear, but mutually inconsistent lines of authority. The
validity of rezoning ordinances seems to depend upon whether or not Judge Barnes can convince his colleagues that the circumstances are sufficiently analogous to floating zones to
disregard the mistake-change rule.
The ultimate issue is the mistake-change rule itself. Judge Barnes remains unalterably
opposed to it. See Wahler v. Montgomery County Council, 249 Md. 62, 238 A.2d 266 (1968)
(dissenting opinion). The court continues to adhere to it. See Hunter v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 252 Md. 305, 250 A.2d 81 (1969); Board of County Comm'rs v. Turf Valley Associates, 247 Md. 556, 233 A.2d 753 (1967).
39 See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960) where the floating zone provided for limited industrial uses in a primarily residential area. A high-density
residential floating zone was upheld, however, in Donahue v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 412
Pa. 332, 194 A.2d 610 (1963). The opinion attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to distinguish
Eves on grounds other than incompatibility of the "floating zone" use with uses permitted on
surrounding land.
40 Strict performance standards can, of course, minimize or even eliminate the incompatibility stemming from objective factors such as noise, odor, etc. See note 42, infra.
41 See generally Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. Rvv. 1 (1965).
The most striking feature of this type of development is its rejection of the old pattern of
single-family detached residences on uniform "cookie-cutter" lots in favor of cluster development, townhouses, and other techniques resulting in more closely spaced dwellings with provision for open space and recreational areas to be used by all residents jointly. As one commentator described it,
[p]lanned unit development is a concept designed to avoid most of the unfortunate
results of uniform housing development. The planned unit enables the builder to
create, within the confines of a sizable development, a variety of housing types which
will broaden and diversify his market while at the same time enhancing the possibilities of attractive environmental design and providing the public with open space and
other common facilities. In addition, the planned unit provides the builder with the
appealing possibility of accommodating a greater density of living units without sacrificing spaciousness and livability. Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 3, 4 (1965).
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concept. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently used this difference4 2 to
distinguish its leading anti-floating zone case, in the course of an opinion upholding planned unit development. 3 The court, after reviewing what it considered the traditional concept of zoning, described the effect of planned unit
development in these words:
Under traditional concepts of zoning the task of determining the
type, density and placement of buildings which should exist within any
given zoning district devolves upon the local legislative body. In order
that this body might have to speak only infrequently .on the issue of
municipal planning and zoning, the local legislature usually enacts detailed
requirements for the type, size and location of buildings within each given
zoning district, and leaves the ministerial task of enforcing these regulations
to an appointed zoning administrator, with another administrative body,
the zoning board of adjustment, passing on individual deviations from the
strict district requirements, deviations known commonly as variances and
special exceptions. At the same time, the overall rules governing the
dimensions, placement, etc. of primarily public additions to ground, e.g.,
streets, sewers, playgrounds, are formulated by the local legislature through
the passage of subdivision regulations. These regulations are enforced and
applied to individual lots by an admlnstrative body usually known as the
planning commission.
This general approach to zoning fares reasonably well so long as
development takes place on a lot-by-lot basis, and so long as no one cares
that the overall appearance of the municipality resembles 'the design
achieved by using a cookie cutter on a sheet of dough. However, with the
increasing popularity of large scale residential developments, particularly
in suburban areas, it has become apparent to many local municipalities
that land can be more efficiently used, and developments more aesthetically
pleasing, if zoning regulations focus on density requirements rather than on
specific rules for each individual lot. Under density zoning, the legislature
determines what percentage of a particular district must be devoted to open
space, for example, and what percentage used for dwelling units. The task
of filling in the particular district with real houses and real open spaces then
falls upon the planning commission
usually working in conjunction with an
44
individual large scale developer.
It is interesting to note that the challenge to planned unit development was
grounded on arguments similar to those that were successful in Eves, the Pennsylvania floating zone case, and that the court's reasoning in Cheney is consistent
with the rationale of the New York Court of Appeals in Rodgers.
It would appear that, despite the possibility of additional setbacks, the
survival of both the floating zone and the planned unit development against legal
attack can be safely predicted. This is a victory not simply for two new zoning
concepts but also for the notion that zoning administration ought be accorded a
latitude of judicial tolerance sufficient to permit - dare one say encourage?
innovative responses to felt needs.4"
42 The "difference' is largely illusory if operation of the nonresidential activity is circumscribed by adequate performance standards with respect to noise, odor, effluent emission, offstreet parking, screening, maximum height and lot coverage, etc.
43 Cheney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc., 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
44 Id. at 628-30, 241 A.2d at 82-83.
45 Other devices to increase zoning flexibility include the conditional grant of special excep-
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3. Rezoning
As we have seen, controversies over flexible zoning devices are often
presented to the judiciary in the context of reviewing rezoning decisions. This
section will discuss a different type of conflict-one that arises when the ownerdeveloper finds himself entitled to a construction permit under existing zoning
regulations but is confronted by a local legislature determined to alter those
regulations to prohibit his development.
Applying the maxim that "ignorance of the law is no excuse" to zoning
regulations inevitably leads to the conclusion that every party interested in real
estate has record notice of the relevant provisions of the applicable zoning
ordinances.4" A corollary proposition is that every interested party is on notice
that the zoning ordinance can and may be amended so as to alter the pattern of
permissible uses or structures. What, then, of the situation where a construction
permit is issued but the zoning ordinance is later amended so as to prohibit the
use or structure authorized by the permit?
A result consistent with the foregoing reasoning would suggest that the
permit is revoked by the zoning amendment. The weight of authority is in
accord with this conclusion."' There is a widely recognized exception, however:
where the owner has expended substantial sums in good faith reliance upon his
permit, it is not revoked by a subsequent zoning change.4" This is easily identified
as an application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Relief for the landowner
turns upon favorable resolution of two issues: (1) have substantial sums been
expended (2) in justifiable reliance upon the building permit? A negative
finding on either issue precludes exemption from enforcement of the amended
ordinance.
The "substantial expenditure" issue hinges not only on the amount expended but, in some jurisdictions, also on the type of expenditure. Substantial
expenditures are sufficient to support an estoppel only if they are expended for
actual construction of a new structure. In one recent case,49 the court ignored a
$56,000 architect's fee that was paid in reliance on the building permit and held
that the amended ordinance revoked the permit. This result is questionable. So
long as so-called "front end" costs (e.g., architect's fees, financing fees, advances
to builders, expenditures for site clearing and preparation) are substantial, are
incurred in good faith, and will be lost if the permit is invalidated by the zoning
change, the requirements for estoppel seem to be met. There is, happily, authority for this proposition.50
The "substantial expenditure" requirement was dispensed with in two recent
cases that held the subsequent enactment inapplicable because it was not pendtions, variances, and rezoning amendments. See generally 1 R. ANDERSON,
ZONING

46

§§ 8.17-8.21 (1968) [hereinafter cited as

See 8 E.

AmERICAN LAW OF

ANDERSON].

MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 25.56 (3d ed. 1965)

[hereinafter cited as MCQuILLIN].
47 1 ANDERSON § 4.27; 8 MCQUILLIN §§ 25.66, 25.156; 2 A. RATHxOPF, ZONING AND
PLANNING ch. 57, § 1 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as RATHKOPF].
48 8 MCQUILLIN § 25.157; 2 RATHKOPF ch. 57, § 3.
49 Ross v. Montgomery County, 252 Md. 497, 250 A.2d 635 (1969).
50 See, e.g., Krekeler v. Saint Louis County Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 422 S.W.2d 265
(Mo. 1967).
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ing before the local legislature at the time the building permit was or should
have been issued.'

This result cannot be supported on estoppel theory; it

probably reflects judicial impatience with local legislatures that use the police
power as a weapon in cat-and-mouse games with developers. Decisions of this
sort may impel local legislatures toward systematic review of zoning ordinances
so that desired changes can be made in advance of the filing of applications for
construction permits.
The "justifiable reliance" issue is, of course, generally a question of good
faith on the part of the construction perrittee. A corollary principle has
developed, however, to the effect that there cannot be good faith reliance on an
invalid permit.5 2 While this may be a satisfactory generalization, it cannot be
slavishly followed, as the New York Court of Appeals recently recognized.5
Where the invalidity of the permit is attributable to a legal technicality 4 and
good faith on the part of the permittee is indicated, the requirements for estoppel
are met and the permit should survive subsequent zoning changes."5
In an unusual case,5" the Nevada Supreme Court reversed itself on rehearing and declined to enjoin the defendant from seeking a rezoning amendment
from the city of Reno with respect to its land. The injunction was viewed as an
unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative province," in spite of
51 Ben Lomond, Inc. v. City of Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968); Gallagher
v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
52 See 8 MCQUILLIN § 25.157.
53 Jayne Estates, Inc. v. Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417, 293 N.Y.S.2d 75, 239 N.E.2d 713 (1968).
54 In Jayne Estates the permit was issued in reliance on an agreement between the developer and the local legislature. Technically, only the local board of zoning appeals had the
authority to approve the developer's plan. The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the
original arrangement had received approval from the village's planning board and that the
zoning board had had knowledge of it and had not expressed any opposition. Finally, the
agreement had been filed and approved in the supreme court in settlement of an action pending
between the developer and the village.
55 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Jayne Estates is its procedural posture. An owner
of nearby land had successfully contested the original permit on the ground of its invalidity,
and the court of appeals refused to review the decision. Thereafter, the developer sought a
variance so that it could proceed with its original plans. The zoning board and supreme court
held there was insufficient showing of hardship to warrant a variance. The court of appeals
affirmed a judgment of the appellate division reversing the lower court. On the issue of reliance
on an invalid permit the court stated:
The problem is not unlike that involved in those cases where a property owner
argues that he has obtained a vested right to build for a use no longer permitted
under a new or amended zoning law. The test in such cases is whether substantial
construction expenses have been incurred prior to the effective date of the new law
or, if no building permit has been issued, whether the property was purchased without
knowledge of the proposed change and sums were thereafter expended in anticipation
of the issuance of the permit, but the municipal officials deliberately delayed the
processing of the application and misled and hindered the applicant in order to prevent the accrual of any rights.... In principle, a similar rule should be applied to
the situation here. In particular, if there was good faith reliance on the invalid permit, it should be considered in determining whether Jayne has suffered "unnecessary
hardship." 22 N.Y.2d at 423, 293 N.Y.S.2d at 79, 239 N.E.2d at 716.
The factual background of the case, as presented in the opinion of the court of appeals,
presents an excellent case study in conflict between the developer and his neighbors and local
legislature, as well as the intricate series of legal proceedings required to bring the matter to
conclusion.
56 Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., Inc. v. Hunter Lake Parent Teachers Ass'n, Nev. -,
451 P.2d 713 (1969).
57
In Nevada it is established that equity cannot directly interfere with, or in advance restrain, the discretion of an administrative body's exercise of legislative power
[citing case]. This means that a court could not enjoin the City of Reno from entertining Eagle Thrifty's request to review the planning commission recommendation.
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a factual situation that seemed to favor the plaintiff.5 8
4.

Control of Population Density

Zoning litigation presents no current problem of greater intractability than
density control. Population density correlates directly with demand for municipal services such as schools, fire and police protection, and water and sanitary
facilities. To the extent that local density controls are related to a municipality's capacity to supply these services (assuming a good faith effort to do so) they ought
be accorded at least prima facie validity. Selective application of such controls,
however, tends to influence the timing, location, and type of new housing construction in the community. The inevitable result is a shifting of development
initiative away from individual developers toward the local legislature (with the
advice and consent of its planning commission). While this situation is accepted
as the norm in several western European countries, it is often regarded with
disfavor by the American judiciary.59
Two density control devices that have been the subject of considerable
litigation are minimum lot size regulations and provisions for exclusion of, or
severe restrictions upon, apartments in residential zones. These controls are now
widely employed, especially in suburban communities on the fringe of large
urban concentrations and in resort areas. In many instances, however, their
use reflects considerations other than legitimate concern for providing newcomers with essential municipal services. The dominant motive may be a desire
to prohibit entry of "undesirables" into the community. Density controls thus
present an opportunity to accomplish indirectly-through exercise of "state
action?'6° a goal that could hardly be constitutionally achieved directly through
enactment of ethnic and religious qualification or minimum income requirements
for eligibility to reside in the community.
Restricting a community to large single-family residential lots, however,
virtually assures that only expensive houses will be constructed. Similarly, open
space, minimum floor area, and other multifamily dwelling restrictions assure
that only luxury apartments will be economically feasible in the community.
Hence, it just "happens" that as the community develops it retains an overwhelmingly white, middle class constituency. Density control regulation thus
spans the entire spectrum from clearly valid to obviously invalid, depending
upon-what?
This established principle may not be avoided by the expedient of directing the injunction to the applicant instead of the City Council. Id. at -,
451 P.2d at 714.
58 On three previous occasions the local planning commission had denied defendant's
request for the change. Plaintiff argued that the city ought not be permitted to grant defendant's fourth request absent a change of circumstances, equity having ample power to enjoin
"vexatious litigation." The Reno Municipal Code, however, provides that an unsuccessful
applicant for rezoning may reapply after six months without limiting the number of successive
applications that may be filed.
The court, properly recognizing that the problem stemmed from the loose procedural
provisions of the ordinance, held that the remedy '(since those provisions could hardly be found
in conflict with the state constitution) would have to come from the local legislature by way of
an amendment to the ordinance.
59 See, e.g., Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
Cf. 1 ANDERSON §§ 7.26-.27, 7.32; 8 MCQUILLIN § 25.27.
60 Zoning was held to be state action within the purview of the fourteenth amendment at
least as long ago as Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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Since courts must struggle with complex issues in cases contesting the
validity of density controls, a neat pattern of consistency in their rulings is beyond
legitimate expectation at present. We shall first consider the recent cases involving minimum lot size restrictions.
In recent years minimum lot area restrictions ranging from one-half acre
62
to five acres have been sustained."' In one case involving a five-acre minimum,
a planning consultant to the local legislature testified as follows:
"[W]e have provided five types of R or residential districts, R-1, R-2, R-3,
R-4 and R-5. The standards applied to these different districts [are] designed in that order, that is R-1 being the most restrictive, and R-5 the
least restrictive as to the standards which apply in each district, with each
one designed to meet a specific need in 'the County, leveling to the lowest
one, the R-5. Generally that's the area where the most modest kind of home
are [sic] of a type on the smallest size lots would be permitted, and would
seem to meet the need for the very lowest income home occupants, including even the migratory or seasonal workers that have to be housed, and we
have provided amply for those needs in a number of different locations in
the County, particularly near the industrial areas, and it is not a question
of forcing people to go into one district or another. We are simply providing different types of areas to meet different needs, different size lots with
different size income, we will say, and different standards that apply, and
that's the sense of our zoning." 6
The contested districts accounted for less than seven percent of the county's
total area, and the court found that the county's small population was "not
expected to increase more than 25 percent in the next ten years.""6 These
circumstances, said the court, were sufficient to distinguish a recent Pennsylvania
decision" invalidating four-acre minimum lot size and a prior Virginia decision66
invalidating two-acre zoning.
The Kohn case is distinguishable on its facts, since considerable population
pressure was already in evidence from two distinct urban areas, and the contested
classification included approximately thirty percent of the county's total area.
Nevertheless, a difference in judicial attitude toward density controls is apparent
in a comparison of the following passages from the two opinions. From the
Miles case:
We agree that if the primary purpose or effect of the ordinance is to
benefit private interests, rather than the public welfare, the legislation
61 Levy v. Board of Adjustment, 149,Colo. 493, 369 P.2d 991 (1962); Senior v. Zoning
Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959); County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228
A.2d 450 (1967); Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687
(1965); Mountcrest Estates v. Mayor and Township of Rockaway, 96 N.J. Super. 149, 232
A.2d 674 (Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 50 N.J. 295, 234 A.2d 402 (1967); Levitt v. Village of
Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 160 N.E.2d 501 (1959); Jones v. Town of
Woodway, 70 Wash. 2d 977, 425 P.2d 904 (1967).
62 County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967).
63 Id. at 355, 228 A.2d at 456.
64 Id. at 371, 228 A.2d at 458. Is this not a self-fulfilling prophecy?
65 National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The holding
did not invalidate four-acre zoning per se but only as applied to the facts found with reference
to the defendant township.
66 County Bd. of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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cannot be held valid merely because some of its incidental effects may be
for the general good. On the other hand, if the ordinance has a substantial
relationship to the general welfare of the community in that it can fairly
be taken as a reasonable effort to plan for the future within the framework
of the County's economic and social life, it is not unconstitutional because
under it some persons may suffer loss and others be benefited. Courts of
other states have had occasion to balance these factors; the decisions, as we
read them, turn on the various economic, physical and sociological factors
involved in the particular case.
Conditions in Queen Anne's County may change. Megalopolis, in its
sweep, may engulf even Maryland's Eastern Shore. With increasing leisure
and the endemic yearning for life on the water front, the five acre limitation
as applied to the County's river frontage may prove too restrictive. 67
From the Kohn case:
Four acre zoning represents Easttown's position that it does not desire
to accommodate those who are pressing for admittance to the township
unless such admittance will not create any additional burdens upon governmental functions and services. The question posed is whether the
township can stand in the way of the natural forces which send our growing
population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place
to live. We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future
burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public
services and facilities cannot be held valid. Of course, we do not mean to
imply that a governmental body may not utilize its zoning power in order
to insure that the municipal services which the community requires are
provided in an orderly and rational manner.
The brief of the appellant-intervenors creates less of a problem but
points up the factors which sometime lurk behind the espoused motives
for zoning. What basically appears to bother intervenors is that a small
number of lovely old homes will have to start keeping company with a
growing number of smaller, less expensive, more densely located houses.
It is clear, however, that the general welfare is not fostered or promoted
by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and exclusionary.6s
In each case the parties to the dispute were a private developer and the
local legislature. The Kohn opinion, however, manifests a much more keen
awareness of interests not represented to the court by either the formal parties to
the action or by various arnici curiae.
In Carper,6 a two-acre minimum lot size restriction had been imposed
throughout the western two-thirds of the county, which contained only ten
percent of its population. In addition, the county's population had more than
doubled in the previous seven years. In the course of declaring this regulation
invalid, the court pointedly noted that its economic effect would be to force
low-income families to live in the eastern one-third of the county, reserving the
rest for their more affluent "neighbors."
67 246 Md. at 368, 373, 228 A.2d at 457, 459.
68 419 Pa. at 432-33, 215 A.2d at 612.
69 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).

[Vol. 45:399]1

DEVELOPMENTS IN LAND USE CONTROL

It cannot be gainsaid that by referring to such relevant and objective criteria
as current growth rate and total population density "mix," the Maryland court
grounded its conclusion on a firmer foundation than do those courts that are
content to state banally that, with fewer residents, the municipality's problems
"due to the population explosion will be lessened." 7 On the other hand, it is
difficult to pass over lightly, as the court did, the testimony in the Maryland case
that the needs of low-income families have received ample provision, "particularly near the industrial areas, and it is not a question of forcing people to go
into one district or another."'" The record in Miles clearly demonstrates the
utility of zoning in effectuating economic segregation. By sustaining the hyperrestrictive five-acre minimum lot size requirement, the court gave implicit support
to the scheme of economic segregation; the cream is approved because it represents only a small percentage of the total volume in the bottle, and no matter
that it rests in comfortable isolation on top of the milk.
It could be that the systematic use of the zoning power by suburban communities to deny or restrict access to members of "lower" ethnic and economic
strata, or to confine them to the least desirable locations, will one day be recognized as an infringement of constitutionally protected rights. In this connection,
a recent article cogently argues that snob zoning violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2
A recurring issue in the area of population density control arises out of
the effort of suburban and resort communities to exclude apartment buildings
from the community.3

In fairness, it is at least arguable that multifamily dwell-

ings impose greater costs for public services than they return to the municipality
by way of ad valorem taxation.74 Thus, ordinances restricting apartment development in suburban or resort areas present questions similar to those previously discussed in connection with minimum lot size. In a recent Arizona case,7
a developer's petition to rezone land surrounding a golf course for multifamily
dwellings was denied by the local legislature. A trial court decision holding that
the local legislature had acted arbitrarily was reversed by the court of appeals
despite evidence that the proposed rezoning would not have an adverse effect
on values of surrounding property. The opinion includes tiis illuminating
passage:
There was testimony presented to the effect that some people prefer to live in denser areas while others prefer to live in rural areas and
therefore low density zoning is established to provide for the welfare of
people that seek the rural way of life. The low density zoning minimized
traffic hazards, dust and air pollution, noise and other disagreeable facets

of high density living.
70 E.g., Mountcrest Estates, Inc. v. Mayor and Township of Rockaway, 96 N.J. Super.
149, 154, 232 A.2d 674, 677 (Super. Ct.), cert. denied, 50 N.J. 295, 234 A.2d 402 (1967).
71 See text accompanying note 63, supra.
72 Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. Rtv. 767 (1969).
73 The apartment house has been characterized as "a mere parasite" interfering with "free
circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun.' Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 394 (1926). The origirs of this antiapartment bias are explored in Babcock &
Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA:. L. Rsv. 1040 (1963).
74 But see Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 73, at 1062-65.
75 Rubi v. 49'er Country Club Estates, Inc., 7 Ariz. App. 408, 440 P.2d 44 (1968).
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We take judicial notice of the fact that the City of Tucson, by virtue
of its climate, which affords relief from numerous ills such as arthritis
and respiratory difficulties, has a unique attraction. Bearing this in mind,
we fail to see how low density zoning cannot
but be consistent with and
76
promotive of the general health and welfare.
By contrast, a recent New York decision" dealt with the validity of a zoning
ordinance amendment designed to prohibit further construction of multiple dwellings. The rezoning amendment converted plaintiff's land from multifamily use
to a single-family classification. The justification advanced for the amendment
was that it would forestall an increase in the volume of effluent discharged into
the village's sewage system (and eventually into the Hudson River) until such
time as more adequate sewage treatment facilities could be constructed. The
ordinance was held invalid as to the plaintiff since it shifted a burden attributable to general community conditions to a few landowners and in the process
prevented the use of plaintiffs property for any purpose to which it could be
reasonably adapted. The court concluded that since the village could require
the plaintiff to pay his share of the cost of new sewage facilities through water
and sewer assessments, it was "impermissible to single out this plaintiff to bear
a heavy financial burden because of a general condition in the community.""8
Arguably, there were stronger health, safety, and welfare grounds (i.e., a temporary sanitation emergency) for upholding the New York ordinance than the
Arizona enactment. Still, the latter was sustained while the former was held
invalid. The explanation for this apparent anomaly may be that the New York
court, though urban-oriented, retains a sensitivity to investment-backed individual expectations," while the Arizona court is more sympathetic toward exercise
of the police power to preserve static development conditions. 0 In any event, it
is clear that the differences between the two decisions are more easily attributable
to judicial viewpoint than to legal doctrine.
The duty of a municipality to accept and accommodate the inevitable population increment attributable to expanding urbanization of nearby communities
has been alluded to earlier. 1 Also well established is the duty of a municipality to
76 Id. at 413, 440 P.2d at 49.
77 Westwood Forest Estates, Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d
700, 297 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1969).
78 Id. at 427, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 132, 244 N.E.2d at 702.
79 The owner produced evidence showing that his property was worth $125,000 for apartment use and only $10,000-15,000 for one- or two-family residences. Id. at 426, 244 N.E.2d at
701, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
80 The court referred to testimony indicating that low-density zoning had been established
for those who "seek the rural way of life." Evidence of the appeal of other townhouse projects
in proximity to golf course developments similar to the owner's was dismissed with the comment that those developments "were in far distant areas of metropolitan Tucson." 7 Ariz. App.
at 413, 440 P.2d at 49.
81 See text accompanying notes 61-71 supra. In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. the court
stated:
If it be a proper exercise of the police power to relegate industrial establishments to
localities separated from residential sections, it is not easy to find a sufficient reason
for denying the power because the effect of its exercise is to divert an industrial flow
from the course which it would follow, to the injury of the residential public if left
alone, to another course where such injury will be obviated. It is not meant by this,
however, to exclude the possibility of cases where the general public interest would so
far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be
allowed to stand in the way. 272 U.S. at 389-90.
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consider existing conditions in adjacent communities' before imposing zoning
regulations upon its own peripheral areas.82 A recent Second Circuit decision
raises the prospect of a conflict between these two municipal responsibilities."
The plaintiff, a New Jersey township, sued a New York town alleging that by
rezoning property contiguous to the New Jersey line for an "office park," it had
deprived the plaintiff of property without due process of law. The alleged
deprivation consisted of (1) a reduction in value of land within the plaintiff
township, accompanied by a loss of tax revenue; and (2) the necessity for
additional expenditures by the plaintiff to provide for adequate traffic and
other related expenses attributable to the defendant's rezoning action. In essence,
the plaintiff argued that while the defendant will enjoy the high-revenue, low
service-cost offices, the New Jersey town will be forced to accommodate the highcost, low-revenue population generated by the office complex on defendant's
land.
The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the district court dismissing
the action and held that the plaintiff had standing to sue.84 The case was remanded to the district court with the comment that "it may prove difficult to
establish that the challenged zoning ordinance was arbitrary and capricious." 5
Should there be further litigation, it will be interesting to observe the manner in
which the federal judiciary evaluates the two conflicting municipal duties as well
as the extent to which reference is made to state law.
The literature of zoning has been significantly enriched recently by the
publication of Professor Anderson's comprehensive treatise.86 Several recent
articles of more than routine or local interest have also become available. 7
B. Subdivision Control
This area of land use law has generated a much smaller volume of litigation
than zoning. Subdivision control originated with a felt need for certainty in land
conveyancing;"8 it expanded in the 1930's to include a form of consumer pro82

The leading case is Borough of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d

441 (1954). See 1 ANDERSON § 5.09.

83 Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown, 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968).
84 "We hold that a municipal corporation like any other corporation is a 'person' within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and is entitled to its protection." Id. at 686.
85 Id. at 687. The "arbitrary and capricious" standard was taken from Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926): "[lIt must be said before the ordinance can be declared
unconstitutional that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
86 R. ANDERSON, AMERcAN LAW OF ZONING (1968).
87 Babcock & Bosselman, Citizen Participation: A Suburban Suggestion for the Central
City, 32 L. & CONTEMP. PRoB. 220 '(1967); Bowe, Regional Planning Versus Decentralized
Land-Use Controls-Zoning for the Megalopolis, 18 DEPAUL L. Rav. 144 (1968); Cunningham, Public Control of Land Subdivison in Michigan: Description and Critique, 66 MIcH. L.
Rav. 3 (1967); Freeman, Towards a National Policy an Balanced Communities, 53 MINN.
L. REv. 1163 (1969); Makielski, Zoning: Legal Theory and PoliticalPractice, 45 J. URnAN L.
1 (1967); Mixon, Jane Jacobs and the Law-Zoning for Diversity Examined, 62 Nw. U.L.
Rnv. 314 (1967); Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 267 (1968);
Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and to Promote Aesthetics Along Transportation Corridors, 17 BuFF. L. Rnv. 701 (1968).
88 Typical requirements include the specification of material from which subdivision plats
must be made, and the enumeration of required engineering data such as indication of the
north point, location of monuments, lot lines and streets. Finally, a form of surveyor's certificate is frequently prescribed. Plats that fail to meet the requirements are ineligible for recording.
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tection legislation requiring subdividers to provide minimally adequate streets
and utilities." The runaway housing demand characteristic of the post-World
War II era has added a significant new dimension to the subdivision control
picture. Financially overburdened municipalities have attempted to shift to subdividers a part of the cost of investment in new public facilities necessitated by
residential development. Consequently, plat recordation has been conditioned
upon dedication of land for park, playground, or school uses. A subsequent
refinement in this procedure has been to convert the land dedication requirement
into a cash exaction for each new residential building lot, to become part of a
municipal school or park fund.
A flurry of litigation from 1964 to 1966 culminated in Montana, New York,
and Wisconsin decisions upholding such requirements as a proper exercise of the
police power." While there have been contrary holdings in some subsequent
cases,9 ' the validity of these exactions, assuming proper authorization, seems
reasonably well assured.
In general, courts have experienced less difficulty in upholding subdivision
control regulations requiring installation of improvements within the subdivision
boundaries than with those that require provision of public facilities outside the
subdivision. In a New Jersey case," a developer was required to pave a previously
dedicated but unimproved road 361 feet from the subdivision boundary to a
public road. Access to another public road already existed.
The New Jersey
Supreme Court invalidated the requirement but flatly declined to hold that no
off-site improvement requirements were authorized by the state's subdivision
control enabling act. The court reasoned:
The Land Subdivision Ordinance of Princetown Township does not
establish any procedures or standards by which the cost of off-site improvements might be apportioned to the subdivider on the basis of the benefits
to the subdivision. This deficiency in the ordinance is fatal to the Planning
Board's attempt to require the paving of the off-site right-of-way. It is clear
to us that, assuming off-site improvements could be required of a subdivider, the subdivider could be compelled only to bear that portion of the
cost which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and benefits
conferred upon, the subdivision. It would be impermissible to saddle the
developer with the full cost where other property owners receive a special
benefit from the improvement [citing case]. In the present case, it is
stipulated that lands to the north of plaintiff's subdivision would benefit
89 E.g., street widths in conformity to established master plans, curbs and gutters, paving
requirements and installation of water and sewer facilities.
90 See Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a
Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871 (1967).
91 In Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. Super. 74, 230 A.2d
45 (1967), a superior court judge held that mandatory cash exactions in lieu of land dedication
were an unconstitutional tax. None of the leading cases is cited or discussed. Cash exactions
were held to be unauthorized by existing enabling legislation in West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966). The court specifically declined, however, to
"prejudge" the constitutionality of such exactions if properly authorized.
92 Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336 (1968).
93 This fact distinguishes the case from Noble v. Township of Mendham, 91 N.J. Super.
111, 219 A.2d 335 (Super. Ct. 1966), where an intermediate appellate court held that the subdivider could be required to furnish access to the existing street or highway network where none
previously existed.
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from the improved road. Thus, it is clear that the total cost of the road

cannot be imposed on the plaintiff. In view of the need for such apportionment, there must be adequate standards and
4 procedures for determining
how the allocation of costs should be made.
This is a sensible and perceptiye response to an issue whose resolution can best
be assured by encouraging local governments to formulate uniform standards.
All too often, subdivision control has proceeded on a purely ad hoc basis.
An analogous problem arises with respect to extension of municipal water
and sewer lines to proposed subdivisions. Frequently the developer is required
to bear the entire initial cost of such "off-site" extensions with the municipality
rebating a portion of the fees it collects from subsequent users who tap onto
the extension. In effect, the scheme is a mandatory interest-free loan by the
developer to the municipality. The technique has apparently not been questioned in recent litigation.
Two Texas cases," however, presented a controversy over "on-site" water
mains, i.e., extensions within the subdivision boundary. In each case the municipality permitted nondevelopers to recoup the cost of on-site extensions out of
subsequent tap-on charges but refused to pay rebates to developers. The developers contended that this was discriminatory treatment, a denial of equal
protection, and a taking of property without just compensation. In both cases
these contentions were rejected. The Crownhill Homes opinion contains an
analysis of the costs of water service extension, indicating that the cost to the
subdivider was not disproportionate to the cost to the municipality. Neither
opinion, however, provides a satisfactory discussion of the validity of the distinction between developers and nondevelopers. Crownhill Homes does hint
that serious rate-making problems and revenue bond financing dislocations could
result from a decision favorable to the developer. It is nonetheless unfortunate
that no serious analysis of the propriety of the developer-nondeveloper distinction
was attempted.
In a recent Illinois case,98 the owner of a twenty-five-acre parcel submitted
a plat subdividing his land into two new tracts. One, aggregating eight and onehalf acres, contained a residence; each had direct access to a public street.
Recordation of the plat by the municipality was conditioned upon dedication of
two strips of land (33 ft. by 2,000 ft. and 66 ft. by 355 ft.) for roadway
purposes.
The Illinois Supreme Court held that these requirements were improperly
imposed. There is ample precedent for requirements that subdividers provide
streets within their subdivisions adequate to serve the new lots created thereby.
The Illinois court, however, reiterated its prior holdings that no subdivision
control requirement can be sustained unless the need for it is specifically and
94 52 N.J. at 350-51, 245 A.2d at 337-38.
95 Crownhill Homes, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 433 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Johnson v. Benbrook Water & Sewer Authority, 410 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App. (1966)),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
96 People v. City of Lake Forest, 40 Ill. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819 (1968).
97 E.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Petterson v. City of
Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
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uniquely attributable to the development of the subdivision."8 During oral
argument, however, the subdivider had stated that he had no plans to develop his vacant tract.9
The result is sound, but the opinion is somewhat puzzling. Cases that have
upheld subdivision exactions for street, recreational, and educational purposes
without applying the "uniquely attributable" test are cited and distinguished
on the ground that in each the subdivider was a residential developer. The Illinois subdivider, of course, was not; thus the cases are distinguishable. Despite
this the difficulty arises from the fact that there is contrary Illinois authority
where the subdivider was clearly a developer.' ° It may be that the Illinois court
is retreating from its "specifically and uniquely attributable" test and is instead
restricting its application only to nondeveloper subdividers.
Finally, a New Jersey decision, 1 adjudicating the constitutionality of a
state statute0 2 authorizing municipalities to "reserve" land within proposed subdivisions for one year as potential park and playground sites, deserves attention.
The purpose of the reservation, or "freeze," is to forestall construction of improvements on the reserved land during the time allotted the municipality to
reach a decision as to its purchase. In this respect, the procedure resembles
official mapping techniques, which have been upheld with respect to streets
03
even though the reservation is for an unlimited period."
With respect to reservation for parks, however, a three-year reservation has been held unconstitutional while a thirteen-month period has been sustained.' 0 4
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the statute, holding that in effect

98 See Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960). The
former decision is criticized in Johnston, supra note 90, at 907-9.
99 The subdivider stated that he was attempting to sell the house and had concluded that
it would be more marketable without the additional acreage. 40 Ill. 2d at 283, 239 N.E.2d
at 821.
100 See note 98 supra.
101 Lomarch Corp. v. City of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968).
102
The governing body may, by ordinance after public hearing, establish an official
map of the municipality or of any part or parts thereof. The official map shall be
deemed conclusive with respect to the location and width of streets and drainage rights
of way and the location and extent of public parks and playgrounds shown thereon,
whether such streets, drainage rights of way, parks or playgrounds are improved or
unimproved. Upon the application for approval of a plat, the municipality may
reserve for future public use the location and extent of public parks and playgrounds
shown on the official map, or any part thereof and within the area of said plat for a
period of one year after the approval of the final plat or within such further time as
agreed to by the applying party. Unless within such one year period or extension
thereof the municipality shall have entered into a contract or purchase, or instituted
condemnation proceedings for said park or playground according to law, such applying party shall not be bound to observe the reservation of such public parks or playgrounds. During such period of one year or any extension thereof the applicant for
the plat approval, and his assigns and successors in interest, may use the area so
reserved for any purpose other than the location of buildings or improvements thereon, except as provided in section nine of this act. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.32
(1967), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-1.32 (Supp. 1969) (the amendment added
flood control basins, as well as scenic and historic sites to the official map). Another provision
authorizes issuance of permits for structures within any reserved area when the land cannot
otherwise "yield a reasonable return to the owner." N.J. STAT. ANN § 40:55-1.38 (Supp. 1969).
103 See, e.g., Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936).
104 Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951) (three-year period);
Segana v. Inglesias, 71 P.R.R. 139 (1950) (thirteen-month period).
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it authorizes the taking of a one-year "option" to purchase. Accordingly, the
owner is entitled to compensation.'0 5 Although the statute did not provide for
payment of compensation, the court implied this requirement in order to sustain
the statute.
It is a statesmanlike opinion ifone grants that compensation must be paid.
The only authority cited for this proposition was a prior New Jersey case' in
which a zoning classification required the owner to retain his land virtually in its
natural state. The statute was declared invalid as to the owner as a taking of
his land without compensation.
The vital distinction between the two cases is that the park reservation
carried a one-year time limit whereas the zoning ordinance was of unlimited
duration. If a zoning analogy is applicable, the most relevant would seem to
be "interim" zoning ordinances, which, although freezing land use, have been
sustained so long as the period is not unreasonably long.0 7 The court seemed
particularly concerned over the fact that the, owner would be required to pay
ad valorem taxes on his land during the period of the "freeze." Perhaps a
statutory abatement provision would have induceda more favorable view on
the taking question. In any event, the court's failure to come to grips with the
issue of taking versus regulation is disappointing.
II. Eminent Domain
The United States Constitution limits the power of the federal government
to seize private property. 08 Every state has similar restrictions, of constitutional
or judicial origin.10 9 Legal issues in eminent domain may be conveniently cate'
gorized within the Constitution's own cryptic framework: "private, property,"
"taking," "public use," and "just compensation." The first two concepts are
closely related (and sometimes overlap) since each necessitates judicial,delineation of the point at which public interference with private interests becomes
compensable. The third constitutes a limitation on the purposes for which public
interference is deemed justifiable. Theoretically, only after the first three clusters
of issues are favorably settled, i.e., that the purpose is proper and the interference
is compensable, is the fourth reached: the amount of compensation the sovereign
must pay for its interference. It is convenient to employ a similar classification
scheme for our summary of recent developments in eminent domain.

105 "The 'option' price should, among other features, reflect the amount of taxes accruing
during the 'option' period. This sum can be established by expert advice and opinion." 51 N.J.
at 114, 237 A.2d at 884.
106 Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J.

539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
107 E.g., Walworth County v. City of Elkhorn, 27 Wis. 2d 30, 133 N.W.2d 257 (1965). See
1 ANDERsoN § 5.15.

108 "[NMor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
109 See 1 P. NicHOLS, EMINENT DoMAiN § 1.3 (rev. 3d ed. 1964). Some states have
added "or damaged" after the word "taken"; otherwise, the wording of state constitutions is
virtually identical to the provision in the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. North
Carolina is the only state that has no such clause; the duty to pay just compensation has been
inferred from that state's due process clause. See Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550 (1874).
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A. Public Use
Several state constitutions expressly provide that the propriety of the purposes for which the sovereign interferes with private interests is a judicial question." ° Attempts to exercise the power of eminent domain have been invalidated
on the ground that they were not in furtherance of an acceptable public purpose."' In recent years, however, courts have increasingly manifested a willingness to defer to legislative decisions as to which public programs and projects sufficiently serve the public interest to justify exercising the power of eminent
domain." 2 There is little reason to doubt that this trend will continue in the
foreseeable future.
One form in which the "public use" issue arises is the area of "excess condemnation." That is, assuming that a particular project qualifies as a public
purpose, is the condemnor limited to taking just enough land to accomplish that
purpose, or may it sometimes appropriate more? In two recent cases, the contention was advanced that the condemnor had acquired land not for completion of public projects but for resale to specific private firms for use in the
ordinary course of their business.
In Katz v. Brandon,"' a case involving an urban redevelopment project,
the court properly noted that resale to private firms is often the end result of
such programs." 4 It refused to review the findings of the redevelopment agency
as to the existence of substandard, unsafe buildings on the land in question.l'
The court went on to dismiss the argument that the taking was for the benefit
of a particular business with the observation that
[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate that any conveyance of land
has been made to [the firm] or that any agreement or understanding exists

which would provide it with any advantage which is not available to
others who may be interested as redevelopers."'
Omartian v. Mayor of Springfield. 7 concerned a city beltway project, with
an alleged excess taking of land for resale to a developer for a shopping center.
110

See 2 P.

NICHOLS, EMINENT

DOMAIN § 7.4 (rev. 3d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as

NICHOLS].

111 For discussion of the expansion of "public use" to encompass public purpose and, finally,
"public advantage," see id. at § 7.2.
112 E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port
of New York Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 379, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, 190 N.E.2d 403 (1963).

E. MCQUILLIN,

THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 32.25 (3d ed. 1964).

See 11

113 156 Conn. 521, 245 A.2d 579 (1968).
114 The public purpose requirement is met through the clearance of slums and blighted
areas. It is not, therefore, necessary for the land taken to remain in public ownership.
115
A finding was made by the agency that the structures in the area were substan-

dard and unsafe, that the facilities were inadequate, and that the conditions were
unsuitable for a residential development and were detrimental to the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the community. This decision is open to judicial review only
to discover whether the agency has acted unreasonably, or in bad faith, or has exceeded its powers. 156 Conn. at 531, 245 A.2d at 585. But cf. Lyons v. City of
Camden, 48 N.J. 524, 226 A.2d 625'(1967).
116 156 Conn. at 534, 245 A.2d at 586-87. The evidence showed that the firm had been
approached with a view to stimulating its interest in purchasing the land in question for expansion of its existing facilities. Later, the firm made an offer to purchase the land, but the
offer was never acted upon. Id. at 527, 245 A.2d at 583-84.
117 354 Mass. 439, 238 N.E.2d 48 (1968).
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In fact, the condemnor had a contract with the developer to convey the land
to him in return for a stipulated "contribution" toward the cost of the beltway
project. Thus the missing link in the Connecticut case - persuasive evidence
of favoritism - was present. The Massachusetts court, however, rejected the
contention that the taking was not for a public purpose with this comment:
IT]he allegations of the present bill do not specifically assert facts which,
if proved, would establish that this taking is primarily for Albano's private
benefit. It also is not improper for a body making an eminent domain
taking to make a reasonable business contract in the public interest in
anticipation of, or because of, the effects of that taking [citing case]. No
facts have been alleged which sufficiently show that the proposed contract
with Albano, by which the city would obtain a substantial contribution by
Albano to the cost of the project, was not in the public interest.1 8s
A demurrer by the condemnor was sustained.
The result is disturbing. In such situations the "public benefit" may be
nothing more than a premium above the anticipated condemnation award,
which an eager developer is willing to pay in order to acquire land unavailable
to him through private market channels. If so, and the demurrer prevented the
plaintiff from establishing this, then the condemnor is simply trading on its
power of eminent domain. Perhaps the promotion of shopping centers along
beltways is itself a public purpose; apparently, no case has yet so held. A direct
approach to the transaction would require legislative authorization to condemn
land for resale as privately-owned shopping centers, and to negotiate privately
with potential purchasers of such land. But this court decision sanctions the
same result by indirection, with no semblance of authorization to the municipality
to use the power of eminent domain for such an end. If excess condemnation
was in fact used for the purpose of recouping part of the project cost, then the
Massachusetts court has repudiated a position of which it has long been considered a leading exponent." 9
Excess condemnation has been frequently upheld in another situation: the
so-called "remnant theory."' 20 A recent California case' 2 presented a new
variation on the remnant theme. A small tract (.65 acres) was taken for a freeway. As a result, an adjacent fifty-four acre tract owned by the condemnee

was landlocked. The condemnor proposed to acquire this tract also, and the
condemnee resisted. The court held that, although the landlocked tract was
not a "remnant" in the physical sense, it could constitute an "economic remnant." Accordingly, the case was remanded with the instructions that the tract

could be acquired if the trial court should find the taking "justified to avoid
118
119

Id. at -, 238 N.E.2d at 51.
See Opinion of the Justices, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E. 405 (1910); 2 NIsaroIs

7.5122[3].

§

120 The justification for this theory is that when part of a parcel or tract is taken and the
remainder is left in such condition as to be of little value, the condemnor may take the whole
and sell the remainder, "it being felt that it will be less expensive in the end for the city to
take and pay for the whole of such lots and . . . sell [the remainder] for a fair price, than to
engage in protracted litigation over the question of damages to the remaining land with each

owner." 2 NrcHoLs § 7.5122[1].
121

People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65

Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968).
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excessive severance or consequential damages."' 2 2 This novel extension of the
remnant theory was justified, said 'the court, by a California statute providing
that:
Wherever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for state highway
purposes and the remainder is to be left in such shape or condition as
to be of little value to its owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or other damage, the department may acquire the
whole parcel and may sell the remainder or may12 exchange the same for
other property needed for state highway purposes. 3
A dissenting opinion argued that the statute's first clause was inapplicable
since it referred to remnants of little value "to the owner," whereas here the
condemnee obviously thought the tract was of value. The second clause, it continued, suggested that a benefit to the state must be found; if the tract was
actually of as little value as the condemnor contended, then there would be no
benefit to the state upon its resale. The dissent went on to characterize the taking
as an application of the discredited recoupment theory.
On the facts of the case, the majority view seems sound. If only the small
acreage was taken, the condemnor would still be required to pay, as "severance
damages," the diminution in value of the remaining tract attributable to the
taking. If, as in this case, the taking has substantially destroyed the value of the
remainder, then in effect the condemnor is required to pay full value for land that
it has not acquired. The condemnee has received a potential windfall at public
expense: he realizes the present value of the land and yet retains title to it.
This windfall is surely undeserving of constitutional protection. In cases where
severance costs will substantially equal the full market value of the remainder,
acquisition of the remaining tract by the condemnor seems unobjectionable;
the sovereign receives no more than it is required to pay for. The more difficult
question, of course, is at what ratio of severance damages to the value of the
remainder does the power of acquisition cease? The majority reiterates that
the trial court can order acquisition of the remainder only if it is necessary to
avoid "excessive" severance damages, without attempting to predetermine the
threshold of excessiveness. Thus there is ample latitude for future litigation
over the scope of the new "economic remnant" justification for excess condemnation." 4

122 Id. at 210, 436 P.2d at 345, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
123 CAL. STREETS & HIGHWAYS CODE § 104.1 (West 1969).
124 The court attempted to forestall one foreseeable but impermissible extension of the new
approach to excess condemnation:
We need not decide in what specific cases other than those mentioned the statute
authorizes excess condemnation. It should be emphasized, however, that the economic
benefit to the state must be clear. The economic benefit of avoiding the cost of litigating damages is not sufficient. The statute does not authorize excess condemnation
anytime the condemnee claims severance or consequential damages. To allow such
condemnation would nullify the constitutional guarantee of just compensation (Cal.
Const., art I, § 14) by permitting the state to threaten excess condemnation, not
because it was economically sound, but to coerce condemnees into accepting whatever
value the state offered for the property actually taken or waiving severance or consequential damages to avoid an excess taking. 68 Cal. 2d at 213-14, 436 P.2d at 347,
65 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
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B. Property-Taking
These are by far the most sensitive and difficult issues in eminent domain.
They are also probably the most important, since their case-by-case resolution
establishes the outlines of the frontier between compensability and noncompensability in a given jurisdiction. These can be characterized as "all or nothing"
issues. Frequently, the moving party is a private owner who asserts that an
interest in his land has been taken for which he is entitled to compensation. This
is the so-called "inverse condemnation" action. Alternatively, the condemnor
may be the moving party but, may deny that compensation is constitutionally
required for some aspects of the damage claimed by the condemnee.
The elements common to all cases in the area are (1) a landowner who
can show diminution of the use and 'enjoyment of his landhence, also a
diminution in its value - attributable to an act of the sovereign, and, (2)
a public authority that, though acknowledging that the landowner has suffered
harm, denies his constitutional claim for compensation. 25
Over the past several years an upsurge in highway construction has generated much litigation over- the compensability of interference inevitably associated with such projects. Two general types of interference are: (1) impairment
of access to highways and thoroughfares, and (2) deprivation of the benefits of
seclusion and view associated with the intrusion of throughways into
formerly remote resort areas.
A number of cases havet held that compensation for such "indirect" interference as impairment of access is not recoverable in the absence of physical
appropriation of some part of the claimant's land.1 28 This view sometimes results
in questionable distinctions, i.e., situations in which two adjoining owners suffer
exactly the same degree of interference, but only one has actually had a strip
of his land condemned.127 Other cases have reiected physical appropriation
28
requirements.1
Even where there has been a physicat appropnauon, however, the cases
are sharply split on the issue of compensation for impairment 29 of access. One
of the leading decisions, People v. Ricciardi,' authorized recovery where a
125 There may, of course, be other theories on which recovery could be predicated, including
tort liability. With the lingering vestiges of sovereign immunity, however, and the "discre'tionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964), the
cause of action in tort is often fraught with considerable risk if not altogether barred. For this
reason, actions that seem to be more compatible with tort liability are sometimes judicially
molded into inverse condemnation proceedings. A prime example is the "avigation easement"
litigation. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
But cf. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962). In recent "sonic boom" cases,
the discretionary function exception has been invoked to deny liability. See McMurray v.
United States, 286 F.Supp. 701 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Schwartz v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 164
(D.N.D.'1965) ; Hutslander v. United States, 234 F.Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
126 See Stoebuck, The Property Rights of Acceis Versus the Power of Eminent Domain, 47
TExAs L. REv. 733, 753-54 (1969); 3 NicRoLs §§ 10.2211[1] to [3].
127 A striking example generated by a taking for construction of a sewage treatment plant is

City of Crookston v. Erickson, 244 Minn. 321, 69 N.W.2d 909 (1955).
128 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760 (1968) ; State v. Tolliver, 246
Ind. 319, 205 N.E.2d 672 (1965); 3 NicHoLs J 10.2211[3].
129 Where access is completely destroyed, compensation is usually recoverable. See Stoebuck,
supra note 126, at 740 n.21; 2 NicTOLS § 6.32.

130 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).
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highway relocation project practically destroyed the visibility of the condemnee's
business from the highway. In addition, direct access from the highway to the
condernnee's land was rendered indirect and circuitous. Perhaps the court was
actually concerned about resultant business losses, but chose to couch the legal
issue in terms of access "rights" so as not to conflict with the widely-accepted
rule that compensation for business losses is not recoverable as a separate item
of damage. 3' In any event, a number of courts have followed Ricciardi, requiring compensation in cases where access was rendered more indirect.'
In
an equally imposing array of cases, compensation for impairment of access has
been denied;.. the California court itself has apparently had second thoughts. 4
Some courts, in awarding compensation, have relied on their state's constitutional provision for compensation when private property is taken "or damaged." Although these two words were introduced into a number of state constitutions for the purpose of liberalizing the compensability standard,"' their
significance ought not be overemphasized. Intrinsically, they manifest no clearer
insight or direction than the single word "taken." No matter which terminology
exists, courts must still formulate their own policy-oriented rationales for discrimination between compensable and noncompensable interferences. Further,
technical analysis might compel the conclusion that the critical issue here is not
"taking" or "damage," but whether or not the asserted right of access is "property" within the purview of the constitution. Again, the court is left to its own
policy-making resources.
It is fair to say that no generally acceptable rationale for dealing with access
impairment has yet emerged. One recent suggestion is that the rule of reason
be applied and compensation awarded for any "substantial" or "unreasonable"
diminution.3 6 Whether the determination is to be made in physical terms, or
economic terms, or by some other criteria, is not disclosed. That such vague
131 The leading case is Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925). The court stated,
however, that the special amenability of land for particular business uses may properly be considered as an element bearing on its fair market value. While the Supreme Court has not
always adhered to the Mitchell doctrine-see Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S.
1 (1949)-it has never questioned the ruling. State courts have followed the same line of

reasoning. See 4 NicHOLS § 13.3. 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW
DOMAIN § 162 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGEL].

or

EMINENT

132 E.g., State v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760 (1968); Clayton County v. Billups
E. Petroleum Co., 104 Ga. App. 778, 123 S.E.2d 187 (1961); State v. Tolliver, 246 Ind. 319,
205 N.E.2d 672 '(1965); Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964);
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Finch, 237 Miss. 314, 114 So. 2d 673 (1959); Balog v.
State Dep't of Rds., 177 Neb. 826, 131 N.W.2d 402 (1964); State Highway Dep't v. Allison,
246 S.C. 389, 143 S.E.2d 800 (1965).
133 E.g., Ray v. State Highway Comm'n, 196 Kan. 13, 410 P.2d 278 (1966); Jacobson v.
State Highway Comm'n, 244 A.2d 419 (Me. 1968); Moses v. State Highway Comm'n, 261
N.C. 316, 134 S.E.2d 664 (1964); In re Lands of Williams, 15 Ohio App. 2d 139, 239 N.E.2d
412 '(1968); Wolf v. Commonwealth Dep't of Highways, 422 Pa. 34, 220 A.2d 868 (1966);
State ex rel. Woods v. State Rd. Comm'n, 148 W. Va. 555, 136 S.E.2d 314 (1964).
134 The liberal approach embodied in Ricciardi and in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.
2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943) prevailed in Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394
P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1964). It was rejected, however, in People v. Ayon. 54 Cal. 2d
217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960) and Blumenstein v. City of Long Beach, 143 Cal.
App. 2d 264, 299 P.2d 347 (1956) (hearing denied by Supreme Court of California). See also
Colberg, Inc. v. State Dep't of Pub. Works, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1967), noted in 21 VAND. L. REv. 277 (1968).
Justice Traynor dissented from the decisions in Bacich and Ricciardi.
135 2 NICHOLS § 6.44; 1 ORGEL § 6.
136 Stoebuck, supra note 126 at 763-65.
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distinctions generally lead into a semantic bog is illustrated by the following
excerpts from a recent decision by the New York Court of Appeals:
It is beyond dispute that mere circuity of access does not constitute a
basis for an award of consequential damages [citing cases]. But, this legal
proposition is controlling in a particular case only if, as a question of fact,
the access involved is shown to be merely circuitous [citing cases]. If the
facts established at the trial of a claim show that the access involved is
more than merely circuitous so that it can be characterized as "unsuitable,"
compensability follows.
"Circuitous," in its commonly accepted understanding, indicates
that which is roundabout and indirect but which nevertheless leads to the
same destination. "Suitable," in its commonly accepted understanding,
describes that which is adequate to the requirements of or answers the needs
of a particular object. The concepts are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, a finding that a means of access is indeed circuitous does not eliminate
the possibility that that same means of access might also be unsuitable in
that it is inadequate to the access needs inherent in the highest and best
use of the property involved.
n
here is virtually no evidence to support the Appellate Division's finding that it was merely circuitous, though its circuity was acutely
apparent from the fact that the remaining access requires vehicles to cross
an opposing stream of traffic on a heavily travelled bridge approach in
order to reach a road paralleling the bridge approach and the bridge itself
on the side opposite the claimants' property, and that that road intersects
with a road which then leads under a bridge to the extreme northern portion of claimants' property, whereas the property taken would allow direct
access from the bridge approach to the southern portion of the property.
The evidence fairly compels the conclusion that the remaining access,
concededly circuitous, was also clearly unsuitable to the established highest
and best use of residential development. Since the evidence so clearly
supports the finding and judgments of the Court of Claims, its judgments
should be3 7 reinstated and the orders of the Appellate Division should be
reversed.

Several recent decisions have held that impairment of view and seclusion
may be taken into consideration in assessing severance damages in cases of partial
taking of resort property for highway purposes.'
By awarding compensation
for frustration of investment-backed expectations, these courts may have adopted
39
sub silentio Bentham's concept: "property is nothing but a basis of expectation."'
But whether the increment of market value attributable to factors such as
seclusion and view is "property," and whether its loss to public improvements
is compensable are two different questions. Unfortunately, only one of the
opinions in the three cases confronts these issues directly. 40 The issue is admit137 Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152, 156-57, 295 N.Y.S.2d 659, 662-64, 242 N.E.2d 827,
829-30 (1968).
138 Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, Cal. 2d -,
449 P.2d 737, 74 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1969);
Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968); Hetland v.
Capaldi, R.I. -,
240 A.2d 155 (1968).
139 J. BENTHAM, THEORY oF LEGISLATION 111 (1931).
140 See Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968)
(Bergen, J., dissenting).
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tedly complex, but the pathway to systematic analysis is by no means unmarked. 41 Clearly, certain interferences associated with transportation must be
borne by the owner even though they reduce the market value of his land.
Judicial opinions ought be addressed to the critical issues: in what situations will
compensation be granted, and does the instant case constitute one of them?
The Sixth Circuit rose to the challenge of an unusual fact situation to
award compensation in a recent case where there had been no physical appropriation of land.1 42 The city of Detroit had commenced eminent domain
proceedings against the landowners in 1950, with a view toward including their
land in an urban renewal project. Ten years later the proceedings were discontinued. In the meantime, former tenants had vacated in anticipation of
eviction by the renewal authority, and the deserted buildings were left to the
mercy of vandals. Finally, in 1962, the city again initiated condemnation proceedings. By then, the structures were completely worthless and the owners
faced a state court proceeding in which their property would be valued as
unimproved land.' 43 Concluding that this state of affairs was attributable to
"misfeasance and nonfeasance" on the part of the city, the district court held
that it had jurisdiction to award damages for the deterioration in value between
1950 and 1962. The circuit court affirmed, noting:
The City of Detroit's action can properly be considered state action
and the accomplishment of what it claimed it had the right to do [i.e., value
the properties as unimproved land] would indeed be a deprivation of
plaintiffs' property "without due process of law" and if the city's aborted
condemnation was a "taking" it was to be carried on "without just compensation," thus would it offend the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.4428 U.S.C. § 1331 provided Federal jurisdiction to vindicate those rights.1
The forthright manner of this decision ought serve as a model for other
courts and a warning to condemnors.'4 5
The Supreme Court handed down an interesting "no taking" decision
during its last term.146 The plaintiff owned land in the United States Canal
Zone territory on the Panamanian border. The land contained a YMCA building and masonic temple. Rioting occurred in the vicinity of these buildings in
January, 1964; they were entered, looted, and one of them was set afire. The
rioters were then driven out by a contingent of U.S. Army troops, who deployed
outside the buildings. The soldiers were later subjected to a barrage of rocks
and similar missiles, as well as molotov cocktails and sniper fire. Finally, they
were ordered into the buildings for their protection. The next day, they were
141 See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 I-Av. L. Rlv. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the PolicePower,
74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
142 Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
143 This is in accord with the prevailing doctrine that in eminent domain proceedings,
property is valued as of the date it is taken. 5 NicHOLS § 18.43; 1 ORGEL § 21.
144 405 F.2d at 144.
145 Accord, Haczela v. City of Bridgeport, 299 F.Supp. 709 (D. Conn. 1969). See generally Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 431
(1969).
146 National Bd. of Y.M.C.A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
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besieged and driven out of the buildings, which then became the subject of
further firebomb attacks causing substantial damage.
Plaintiff sued to recover compensation from the United States for damages
inflicted after the troops had retreated into the buildings. The court of claims
denied relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
There was advance speculation that the court might reconsider th soundness
of its Caltex'4' decision, denying compensation for destruction of private facilities
by U.S. military units to prevent their falling intact into the hands of Japanese
forces during World War II. But Caltex was not even mentioned in
the opinion of the Court. Justices Black and Douglas, who dissented in
Caltex, also dissented in YMCA. In their view, when the troops entered the
buildings for their own shelter and protection they appropriated the structures
"for the benefit of the public generally,"1" s i.e., to safeguard the Canal Zone
from rioters. Subsequent property damage, they reasoned, was thus attributable
to this taking.
Mr. Justice Brennan, however, speaking for the majority, found two alternative grounds for denying compensation. First, the troops were acting to
protect the building when they occupied it; therefore its owner became the
"particular intended beneficiary of the governmental activity."' 49 Second, the
governmental activity did not deprive the owner of the use of its property,
since riot conditions had already rendered it unusable. As for the increment
of damage attributable to the the presence of the troops in or near the building,
this was not a "direct and substantial enough government involvement to warrant compensation under the Fifth Amendment."''
Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, expressed concern over the second alternative. He could conceive of situations in which requisition of buildings
for military purposes would be a taking, even though the owner was not thereby
deprived of its use. Mr. 'Justice Harlan, concurring in the result, announced
a different test for determining compensability of damage to private property
as a result of riot control activities. "[Tihe Just Compensation Clause may only
be properly invoked when the military had reason to believe that its action
placed the property in question in greater peril than if no form of protection had
been provided at all."'' Applying this test to the facts, he concluded that it
precluded the plaintiff from recovering. Comparing the Court's opinion with
his increased risk test, he noted ambiguities in the "particular intended beneficiary" formulation that might result in a conflict with Caltex.5 2 He rejected
the "indirect involvement" ground, focusing on the stipulated fact that the
military had taken shelter in the buildings for their own protection.'
147 United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
148 395 U.S. at 99.
149 Id. at 92.
150 Id. at 93.
151 Id. at 94-95.
152
If, for example, the military -deliberately destroyed a building so as to prevent
rioters from looting its contents and burning it to the ground, it would be difficult
indeed to call the building's owner the "particular intended beneficiary" of the Government's action. Nevertheless, if the military reasonably believed that the rioters
would have burned the building anyway, recovery should be denied for the same
reasons it is properly denied in the case before us. Id. at 97.
153
Ordinarily, the Government pays for private property used to shelter its officials,
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To this author, the Harlan approach seems the soundest, most practical
analysis of the "taking" issue in temporary emergency situations. The only certainty, however, is that Caltex and YMCA have not settled the troublesome
question of compensation for military activities in zones of riot and armed
conflict.
C. Just Compensation
There is growing recognition that, in the administration of compensation
claims, condemnors enjoy a tremendous tactical advantage over condemnees.
Most regrettably, there is evidence that some condemnors have used this leverage
to effect settlements for amounts even lower than the recommendations of their
own appraisers.'
Overreaching on the part of public agencies is arguably no
more conscionable than is the same tactic when employed in private negotiations.
Hence, it follows that victimized condemnees may have a cause of action to set
aside their "settlements" and recover more adequate compensation. If state
courts do not provide an adequate remedy, then perhaps federal jurisdiction
could be invoked by analogy to the Fostercase. 5 '
Recent decisions furnish several indications of a liberal trend in compensation awards. As was mentioned earlier,5 6 the highway access, loss of seclusion,
and interference cases approach the question from the "property-taking" side
and do not purport to alter the standards for determining the amount of compensation payable once an interest is held to have been "taken." In at least
one area, however, valuation methods are undergoing reexamination. Recent
cases involving compensation for takings of land subject to leasehold interests have
abandoned the traditional "unit valuation" technique in favor of independent
valuation of the individual component interests.'5 7 Although this approach may
result in awards in excess of the fair market value of an unencumbered fee
simple in the land, it finds support in both policy and precedent.'58
Given the wide variety of extant governmental and quasi-governmental
programs utilizing the power of eminent domain, a large volume of condemnation litigation is likely in the foreseeable future. Hopefully, some of the many
unresolved "property-taking" and "compensation" issues will be clarified, even
though perhaps not finally settled.
Eminent domain articles of more than routine interest have recently become available.' 59
and I would see no reason to make an exception here if the military had reason to
know that the buildings would have been exposed to a lesser risk of harm if they had
been left entirely unprotected. Id. at 98-99.
154 See Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An Empirical Look into the Practices
of Condemnation, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 430 (1967).
155 See text accompanying notes 142-45, supra.
156 See text accompanying notes 125-45, supra.
157 People v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1967); State
Highway Dep't v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 372, 154 S.E.2d 812 (1967); Sholom, Inc. v. State
Rds. Comm'n, 246 Md. 688, 229 A.2d 576 (1967).
158 See Johnston, "Just Compensation" For Lessor and Lessee, 22 VAND. L. REV. 293
(1969).
159 Aloi & Goldberg, A Reexamination of Value, Goodwill, and Business Losses in Eminent
Domain, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 604 (1968); Ayer, Allocating the Costs of Determining "lust
Compensation," 21 STAN. L. REV. 693 (1969); Dasso, Changing Economic Conditions and the
Condemnation Value of Real Property, 48 Oa. L. REv. 237 (1969); Klein, Eminent Domain:
judicial Response to the Human Disruption, 46 J. URBAN L. 1 (1968); Symposium, Eminent
Domain, 20 HASMNGS L.J. 431 (1969).

